For Antena M by: Miljan Vešović
In our last article, we tried to explain why the political and security situation in the Western Balkans is so precarious and why Montenegro, despite her NATO-ally status, is not spared from the danger. In order to face the imminent danger successfully and emerge from the crisis unscathed (or as unscathed as possible), it is, first and foremost, necessary to establish at least a basic level of cooperation between pro-Montenegrin, pro-Western political forces – regardless of whether they came from the government/ruling majority or from the opposition.
In this article, we will try to outline several concrete steps that can facilitate that cooperation and help Montenegro safeguard her national security.
Montenegro’s intelligence and security apparatus needs to be cleansed from the malign Serbian and Russian influence that has been permeating it for the last four years. It is absolutely essential that Montenegro’s premier intelligence agency, ANB, stops being a “satellite office of security services that function outside of NATO system”, to quote the current Minister of Justice.
ANB is supposed to have its new leadership team appointed soon – that team should be comprised of competent, experienced intelligence professionals whose patriotism, pro-NATO and pro-Western orientation cannot be doubted.
Together with ANB, one of the most compromised parts of the national security apparatus is the Border Police. A state without secured borders is not a state. Moreover, borders between Montenegro and Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska) have been turned into channels for hybrid operations against Montenegro and spread of malign Serbian (and, by extension) Russian influence. It is of great importance to plug this gaping hole in Montenegro’s security.
In addition to all this, with the danger of conflict elsewhere in the Balkans growing by the day, Montenegro needs functional and efficient border police to stop spillovers and handle the influx of refugees should the conflict break out.
In the public sphere, opinion polls are showing that the support for NATO is decreasing in Montenegro. It is the dangerous consequence of the relentless anti-Western propaganda instigated by Serbia, Russia and the Serbian Orthodox Church that has, so far, largely been left unchecked.
It is clear that, for the ruling coalition, openly confronting Serbia and SOC is not politically viable. However, if Prime Minister Spajic is truly pro-Western and committed to Montenegro’s security, stability and European future as he claims to be, it is his, and the responsibility of his government, to promote Western values in Montenegro and explain to their voters the advantages of NATO membership.
Spajic began his political career and became a decision-maker in Montenegro thanks to rabidly anti-NATO and anti-Western SOC. If he has sincerely transformed into a pro-Western, forward-oriented politician committed 100% to leading Montenegro into the EU, he needs to explain to his voters why he made the transformation and convince them to follow him and embrace Euro-Atlantic values.
Regarding SOC, the government also has a unique responsibility to start curbing SOC’s political influence. Again, it would be naïve to think that it can be done by open confrontation – the Prime Minister would be politically “kaput” if he tries that. However, steps can be taken to build a positive, pro-EU and pro-NATO narrative and promote it – that positive narrative would serve as a counterweight to malign Russian and Serbian influence spreading through the SOC. This is not enough to solve the “church problem” in Montenegro, but it is a start.
When it comes to foreign and defense policy and diplomacy, Montenegro needs to bolster its pro-Western credentials abroad and take a more active role in NATO’s missions and operations. The deepening of defense cooperation with key allies, such as the United States, including through equipment purchases, should also be considered. These steps would not only increase Montenegro’s value as an ally (which might be very important if Trump wins the U.S. election), but also ensure that Montenegro keeps in line with NATO standard of 2% of GDP being spent on defense.
In diplomacy, there is a lot of room for improvement in multilateral affairs where, ever since restoration of statehood in 2006 and regardless of who was in power, Montenegro sometimes acted more like a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and less like a NATO-ally. To put it bluntly – U.S, UK, Germany, France, Spain, Poland or Italy are our allies (to name a few) not Seychelles, Cuba, Palestine or South African Republic (also to name a few).
Montenegro’s multilateral diplomacy should be conducted by a simple rule – when all NATO allies and/or EU member states support something, Montenegro does as well. When NATO and/or EU countries are not unanimous, we vote in accordance with our national interests and support allies that are most important for our security and our European integration process. Same goes for supporting candidates for international organizations. Albania has been using a similar approach for a long time – now it is the number one U.S. partner in the region and was also a member of the UN Security Council.
In addition to that, Montenegro is still diplomatically covered (on a non-resident basis) from Belgrade by a lot of countries, including some NATO allies and EU member states. Montenegrin government should make clear that this is not acceptable. This is not in order to be “anti-Serbian” – it is because Montenegro, as a NATO ally and hopefully the future EU member state, should be diplomatically covered by other countries either from Montenegro or, when countries are unable to open diplomatic representations in Montenegro, from another NATO ally or EU member state on a non-resident basis.
Several Montenegrin governments have tried to enforce this in the past, but unfortunately these attempts did not succeed. Now might be the good time to try again.
As far as European Union is concerned, current Montenegrin government has proclaimed the receiving of a favorable Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR) from EU Commission as its top short-term priority. This is all good and well and should be supported. However, it should be kept in mind that a favorable IBAR and consequent closing of Acquis chapters does not automatically mean the membership. Whether Montenegro will become an EU member state or not will depend on other member states, not on Commission. It is an open question if and when the current member states will accept Montenegro as a new member.
Moreover, Serbia and Russia have a vested interest to derail Montenegro’s EU integration process. Therefore, there is a realistic possibility that they will try to topple Montenegro’s government before a favorable IBAR is reached. If the government survives and Montenegro gets its IBAR, it will undoubtedly be a big political success.
Prime Minister Spajic would be well-advised to call for snap elections after the IBAR. It would enable him to capitalize on the success in European Integration process and it would also enable him to get rid of destabilizing pro-Serbian and pro-Russian elements in the current ruling majority, (or at least to significantly limit their capacity for political blackmail after the elections), therefore limiting Serbian and Russian malign influence and paving the way for Spajic to form a truly pro-European and pro-Western government.
Montenegro’s opposition has a significant role to play in these processes as well. First and foremost, they should be constructive and cooperate with the current government where necessary, especially when it comes to European integration process.
On the other hand, they should not forget that they are the opposition and that the Prime Minister and the ruling coalition are their political opponents. So far, Prime Minister’s team has shown a lot of political inexperience and a lack of basic knowledge how the state and its administration work.
Moreover, the government, so far, haven’t shown the willingness to mitigate the devastating consequences of Russian and Serbian propaganda, or to properly confront increasingly blatant attacks on Montenegro’s statehood and Montenegrin national identity. All these failures must be met with a fierce and forceful criticism and protest action from the opposition, both within and outside of the institutional framework.
Forceful reaction by the opposition to these attempts to destabilize Montenegro will not only cement the opposition’s status as the ultimate guardian of Montenegro’s statehood and national identity, but will also help it to position itself better in any future attempts to form a coalition government with parts of current majority – the more strength you show, the more you will be respected by both voters and current political opponents that in the future can be partners.
The opposition also should invest more efforts in explaining to the voters the consequences of malign Serbian and Russian influence. Sometimes, the opposition denounces the occurrence of that influence and stops there. That is not enough – they need to explain to the voters, in concrete, precise terms, what exactly will happen if pro-Russian and pro-Serbian forces take absolute control of Montenegro, how exactly these forces may destabilize the country, and what would these negative scenarios mean for personal security, personal finances, and the way of living of the voters.
Last but not least, the opposition needs to get over their disappointment with the West. Regardless of the negative aspects of U.S and EU current approach in the Western Balkans (which have been highlighted and criticized many times, including by this author), unwavering pro-Western, pro-European and pro-NATO orientation is the only way for Montenegro’s opposition to preserve everything it fought for in the last 20+ years.
Therefore, it needs to renew its relations to international partners and sideline voices that advocate for grievances and confrontation, or that do not understand that the enemies/rivals of the West are their enemies/rivals as well.
The more strength it shows domestically, and the more it is in partner’s good graces internationally, the better chances are that the opposition soon lose its opposition status and become the government again.
The government comprised of proven pro-Montenegrin and pro-Western elements from both the current ruling coalition and the opposition would be best – positioned to lead Montenegro through any ensuing Balkans crisis and move our country closer to the membership in the European Union.
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